Ethnicity, Inequality and the Public Sector: A Comparative Study

Excerpt from Introduction

"Scholars in development studies increasingly recognize that inequalities between groups constitute a more potent source for violent conflict than inequalities among individuals (Stewart, 2000; Chua, 2002; Justino, 2003; Ndikumana, 2004). When inequalities in incomes, wealth, and access to social services or political power coincide with group differences, ethnicity may assume importance in shaping choices and mobilizing individuals for collective action. Yet little is known about the nature and dynamics of ethnic cleavages and inequalities, especially as they affect the public sector, which plays a central role in resource allocation and identity formation. The public sector may be rendered ineffective or illegitimate if it fails to develop mechanisms to regulate difference and ensure inclusiveness.

This paper examines the complex ways ethnic cleavages and inequalities affect public sector institutions. It focuses on issues of inclusion, accommodation and cohesion in the constitution and management of the public sectors of multiethnic societies under formal democratic rule. Ethnicity affects the identities of states, access to institutions, and the confidence different sections of society may have in government. Inequalities arising from the structure of opportunities and the way the public sector is governed are often a source of tension as individuals use group solidarity to maintain or alter advantages.

The paper challenges three influential ideas about ethnicity, governance and cohesion. First, it is often believed by development analysts, political theorists, policy makers and the lay public that countries that are ethnically diverse are likely to be less cohesive and stable (Barry, 1991; Connor, 1994; and Miller, 1995), more prone to violent conflict (Furnivall, 1948; Smith, 1969; Ignatieff, 1993; and Moyniham, 1993), less disposed towards democratic government (Miller, 1995; Barry 1991; Nyerere, 1967; Museveni, 1997), more likely to experience low levels of industrialisation (Gellner, 1983) or growth (Easterly and Levine, 1997), and less likely to sustain universal welfare programmes (Goodhart, 2004). Although some recent quantitative studies (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001a,b; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003) have challenged some of these assumptions, the alternative views they posit have tended to minimise the role of diversity in influencing social and political outcomes. We argue that the relevant issue is not the existence of diversity per se, but types of diversity, which can constrain or support particular outcomes. Ethnic fragmentation does not necessarily produce pathological situations; nor is it helpful to downplay diversity in explaining social behaviour. Ethnic cleavages are configured differently in different social structures and are less conflictual in some countries than in others.

Second, contrary to the assumptions of liberal individualism, it is difficult to achieve proportionality or balance in the public sector if policies are not oriented towards it. Multiethnic societies that adopt ethnicity-blind policies run the risk of creating highly unequal public sectors. Even a cleavage-neutral policy, such as merit-based recruitment or one based on republican civic values, may produce unequal outcomes because of the unequal starting points of groups. Our study suggests that relative balance has been achieved in countries that are highly fragmented or those with ethnicity-sensitive policies that are oriented towards high levels of proportionality. Some countries have achieved less disproportionality in some institutions because of redistributive policies that focus on those institutions. Most of our cases display varying levels of inequality and weakly structured or non-existent policies for promoting balance.

Third, politicians and citizens face different types of constraints in constituting the public sector. These stem from the dynamic interplay of the structures of ethnicity, group dynamics and inequalities. Institutions, however well crafted, may have different levels of significance in different social settings. Ethnic structures with two or three key groups often require ethnically sensitive institutions that provide incentives to cooperate and avoid conflicts. Ethnicity-sensitive institutions may not be relevant in situations where there is one overwhelmingly large group or where the ethnic structure is highly fragmented. In this regard, the paper challenges two policy frameworks that have been held up as solutions to the governance problems of ethnically divided societies. These are majoritarian policies that reward moderation in party behaviour and vote pooling while also encouraging adversarial politics; and consensus-based or power sharing arrangements that seek to accommodate the ethnic segments. The first seeks to promote plurality within the party system by encouraging actors to seek votes outside their ethnic strongholds (Horowitz, 1990). The second accepts ethnic-based parties as given, and promotes plurality at the governmental level rather than in the party system (Lijphart, 1999). Our study suggests that although the pulls of majoritarian rule and power sharing are very strong, they do not always pull in opposite directions. The majority of ethnically segmented countries, like their more homogenous counterparts, have opted for majoritarian solutions. However, ethnic problems have forced some of them to incorporate power-sharing elements in their majoritarian institutions.

The next section of the paper discusses the typology that guides the study. Section three provides a conceptual discussion of public sector institutions as they relate to issues of identities and access. Section four, which is divide into five parts, analyses ethnic cleavages, group dynamics and inequalities in four public sector institutions: cabinet, parliament, civil service and party system. Section five examines institutions for managing diversity and inequality. The institutions range from electoral rules to governance arrangements for power sharing, federalism and decentralisation, and protection of minority rights. Redistributive policies and rules that seek to correct disproportionality are also analysed. An index of ethnic proportionality is developed to guide the discussion on the relative inclusiveness of the different public sectors. Fifteen countries that formed the core of the UNRISD project on Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector provide the basis for the analysis. These countries are Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Ghana, Fiji, India, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Switzerland, Tanzania and Trinidad and Tobago."